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ARGUMENT
INTRODUCTION
Defendants ask this Court for a decision that would prevent the State from ever
enforcing the Utah False Claims Act against systemic pricing abuses of the Medicaid
program. According to Defendants, unless the State files a complaint that is thousands of
pages long, containing detailed descriptions of hundreds of thousands - perhaps millions
- of false pricing reports, Rule 9(b) will forever protect them from liability. Moreover,
they illogically ask the Court to find that Rule 12(b)(6) requires the pleading of nonelements to the State's claims before those claims can move forward. This was clearly
not the intent of the legislature in creating the False Claims Act and is not the purpose of
the Rules of Civil Procedure.
This case is simple, and is about the "average wholesale price" of Defendants'
drugs - a phrase that must be interpreted by its plain language.1 As explained in the
State's opening brief, when Defendants agreed to sell their drugs through the State's
Medicaid program, they agreed to provide regular reports of the "average wholesale
prices" of those drugs to First DataBank - a third-party compendium.

First DataBank

then reports those compiled "average wholesale prices" to the State, which in turn uses

See In re Pharmaceutical Industry Average Wholesale Price Litigation, 460 F. Supp.2d
277, 286-287 (D. Mass. 2006). ("Determining the plain language meaning of the
regulatory and statutory term 'average wholesale price' is a straightforward exercise that
begins with the dictionary.")
2
See Medicaid Plan / Provider Manual, Attachment 4.19-B, p. 19, attached as Addendum
F to the State's opening brief. In some cases, prices by some other name were reported
by Defendants, from which First Databank would calculate "average wholesale prices"
using a metric known only to Defendants.
1

them to calculate its own reimbursement price - a practice in place for many years and
well-known by each Defendant.

As such, Defendants are effectively on an "honor

system/' in that they self-report prices that determine, almost exclusively, what the State
pays for those drugs. If they are accurate, then the State pays accurate prices; if they are
inflated, then the State, in turn, pays inflated prices.
The claims brought by the State therefore revolve around a simple question: Did
Defendants report the accurate prices of their drugs? The State alleges that Defendants
did not, but instead reported inflated prices over a fifteen-year period, thereby causing the
State to grossly overpay for those drugs.
The State's claims are not novel or unique. In the past seven years, at least 52
different state and local Medicaid agencies have filed lawsuits against a large number of
drug companies3 - including the majority of Defendants - pleading essentially the same
allegations. In fact, such a large number of cases have been filed that a multi-district
litigation (MDL) has been established in the Federal District of Massachusetts under
Judge Patti Saris.4
Despite the State's clear allegations and the ample public record of dozens of
virtually identical cases, Defendants now want to cloud and confuse this case in order to
avoid responsibility for their abuses of the State and its citizens. They argue, against
reason, that the State's second amended complaint does not provide sufficient notice of
the claims against them. They insist that before they can be held accountable for their
3

See Addendum A, attached.
In re Pharmaceutical Industry Average Wholesale Price Litigation^ Federal District
Court of Massachusetts, Civil Action No. 01-12257-PBS; MDL No. 1456.

4

2

false reports, the State's complaint must plead details the State does not have,5 such as
the "who, what, when, where, and how" of each of the unknown hundreds of thousands
of reported prices from each Defendant.

They attempt to muddy the waters with

unneeded particularity of the various pricing formulas - FUL, MAC, WAC, etc. obscuring the fact that every one of those formulas is based on Defendants' price reports.
See Second Amended Complaint, *{ 107 (R. at 1135).
Defendants try to get the Court to focus on peripheral questions which are not
elements of the State's claims, such as whether they received benefits directly from the
State, communicated prices directly to the State, or specifically directed others to make
Medicaid drug claims. Defendants argue that the State's alleged failure to sufficiently
describe these non-elements is fatal to the case.

Defendants were successful in

distracting the District Court with this school of red herrings, and are now attempting to
do the same to this Court. Indeed, Defendants say in their brief that the State "will never
be able to plead"6 the level of specificity it asks this Court to require, tacitly admitting
that their goal is to bind justice and restitution in a Gordian Knot of pleading
requirements.
The State's Second Amended Complaint is pled with enough particularity to give
Defendants sufficient notice of the nature of the State's case and claims against them,
regardless of the applicability of Rule 9(b). Moreover, Rule 12(b)(6) does not require a
plaintiff to plead non-elements to a claim to avoid dismissal. Finally, the applicable
5

Including the true "average wholesale prices," which are closely guarded secrets, as
discussed below.
6
Appellees' Brief, p. 30.
3

statute of limitations is not one year, but either four or six years under the clear language
of the statutes involved. The State respectfully asks this Court to rule in its favor and
allow this case to proceed.
I.

The State Does Not Have, And Cannot Plead, The Details Required By
The District Court.
Defendants argue that in order to satisfy the applicable pleading requirements, the

State must plead the specifics of every allegedly inflated report by every individual
defendant. According to the Defendants, as well as the District Court, this includes the
"who, what, when where, and how" of each report, as well as what the State believes
should have been the reported average wholesale price of each drug.
The State does not have this information because it did not receive Defendants'
false pricing reports; those reports were made to First DataBank, which then compiled
and published pricing based on Defendants' reporting. See Second Amended Complaint,
t t 118-119 (R. at 1139). Further, the State was never privy to the true - and often farlower - accurate average wholesale price. See Id., ffi[ 121 (R. at 1140). Those accurate
prices are closely guarded secrets, enshrouded by Defendants in a dense corporate veil.
In short, the State has no way of knowing the detail demanded by the District Court,
without of the discovery process which will force back Defendants' veil of secrecy.
Moreover, even if the State had this information, there is no way of practically
pleading it. Drug companies can and do report regular price changes - often several

4

times per day - which can lead to a thousand or more "prices" for a single drug in any
given year. This is true for the nearly two thousand different drugs that Defendants have
provided through Medicaid during the fifteen year period covered by the State's
complaints.8 Even if the prices were changed only monthly, the State's claims still
contemplate approximately 347,000 pricing reports amongst all Defendants; if the prices
are changed weekly, the number of reports involved jumps to over 1.5 million; if the
prices change daily, more than 10 million reports would have been made by Defendants
during the period at issue.9 For this reason, the State's Second Amended Complaint
pleads the scheme of the abuse, not the individual instances.
A. The automation of the Medicaid reimbursement program prevents the
State from discovering details of individual reports.
Under federal law, drug companies who wish to have their drugs reimbursed by
state Medicaid plans are required to sign a rebate agreement with the Department of
Health and Human Services. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-8(a)(l). This rebate agreement is the

n

See Pearsons' Pharmacy, Inc. v. Express Scripts, Inc., 2009 WL 3623395, p. 4
(M.D.Ala., 2009). (Explaining the daily nature of drug company pricing reports through
First DataBank.); Eufala Drugs, Inc. v. TDI Managed Care Services, 250 F.R.D. 670,
674-5 (M.D. Ala., 2008) (Explaining the "daily, weekly, or monthly" pricing report
updates from drug companies.)
Second Amended Complaint, Exhibit A (listing approximately 1,929 different drugs
provided by the Defendants).
To illustrate the pleading needed to include the basic particular details requested by the
District Court of these reports, consider this: If the State were able to fit the "who, what,
when, where, and how" of each individual report into a single line of text - with 37 lines
of single-spaced text in a page of 13-point type - then 9,379 pages would be needed to
plead 347,000 monthly reports over the 15-year period; 40,541 pages would be needed to
plead 1.5 million weekly reports; and 270,271 pages would be needed to plead 10 million
daily reports. Such a complaint would require 541 reams of paper and fill over 77
file boxes.
5

only gateway to participation; however, it is also the only requirement, and once it has
been fulfilled, the states have little discretion in whether or not they will pay for the
manufacturer's drugs. As such, when Defendants signed their rebate agreements with the
federal government, the State was effectively locked into paying for their drugs under its
reimbursement system.
Due to the enormous volume of price reports, the Medicaid drug reimbursement
system is largely automated.10 Indeed, the only non-automated part of the system is when
a drug company issues its price reports. Those reports are made to third parties, such as
First DataBank; the State is not and never has been a party to those communications. See
Second Amended Complaint, ffl[ 121 (R. at 1140). First DataBank then electronically
conveys the price to the State's database computers as the reported "average wholesale
price" for that drug. When a pharmacy then provides an order for the drug to a Medicaid
recipient, the pharmacy bills the State electronically through the same system. Payment
is then issued automatically as well, without human involvement.11
The State developed this automated process for the sake of efficiency in handling
the massive volume of data and transactions. However, such a system - without human
oversight - lends itself to abuse. Defendants knew this. They knew that inflated reports
to First DataBank would be compiled and given to the State automatically. They knew
that the State's computers would calculate inflated prices based upon those reports, and

10

In fiscal year 2005, there were 3,474,297 prescriptions reimbursed by Utah Medicaid 66,813 per week.
11
See Addendum B, attached. Utah Medicaid Pharmacy Provider Manual, Section 6-1,
describing the automated payment process.
6

that no one would ask questions. They knew that the State's system would then pay
those prices for those drugs without fail. They knew that they would likely never get
caught, because no one was watching. Indeed, twelve years passed before the State
began to suspect that Defendants were abusing the system and its Medicaid program.
In 2003, Massachusetts filed an action against several drug companies for inflated
pricing reports.

Within a short time, a number of other states filed suit as well. This

was the first indication to the State of Utah that Defendants might be abusing the price
reporting system, and the State began an investigation into the reporting to see if it, like
the other states, had been cheated.
As already noted, the State could not do this through the pricing data of the
reimbursement program alone, because it only had the information provided by
Defendants through First DataBank. Instead the State turned to the drug rebate system,
using it to cross-check against samples of Defendants' pricing reports.
The rebate system operates in the opposite direction of the reimbursement system.
In essence, the drug companies agree that whenever the State pays for a drug, the
manufacturer of that drug will give the State a rebate for a certain percentage of the
price.

i^

For example, the rebate percentage for generic drugs is 11% of the "average

manufacturer's price"14 that the company confidentially reports to the federal rebate
system. In theory, assuming honest price reports, this should result in the rebate being at
Massachusetts v. Mylan Laboratories, et al, Federal District Court of Massachusetts,
Civil Action No. 03-11865-PBS.
13
See 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-8
"Average manufacturer's price" and "average wholesale price" are essentially
equivalent.
7

least approximately equal to 11% of the reported average wholesale price. However, the
State's investigation revealed the reality of the situation was far different.
The State's reimbursement system and the federal rebate system are completely
separate; they do not share data, and drug companies have to report their prices to both
systems separately. The State took random samples of pricing from each defendant and
compared them to Utah's estimate of the federal rebate prices;15 in every case, it was
found that the reported "average wholesale price" was significantly higher than the
estimated rebate price.

Through this investigation, the State confirmed that all

Defendants had been reporting inflated prices to First DataBank, and thus to the State's
reimbursement system to induce the State to pay more for their drugs. Then, Defendants
reported far lower prices to the federal rebate system, enabling them to minimize rebates
to the State while at the same time maximizing the prices paid by the State. In essence,
the State was being cheated by at least the pricing system, and perhaps the federal rebate
system as well.
The State filed suit against Defendants in 2007 under the Utah False Claims Act.
In the meantime, it did not have the discretion to stop reimbursing for drugs provided to
Medicaid recipients. Thus, the State continued to pay Defendants' inflated pricing, and it
will continue to do so, until it can force Defendants' honesty through the False Claims
Act. The State is here now, before this Court, in good faith to enforce that law and stop
these abuses of its Medicaid system and taxpayers.
15

The State made this estimation by taking the rebate amount and dividing it by the
known rebate percentage (e.g. 11% in the case of generic drugs), yielding the prices
which Defendants almost certainly reported to the federal rebate system.
8

B. Other state Medicaid actions around the country confirm the widespread
pricing scheme engaged in by Defendants.
Since Massachusetts filed its action against a group of drug companies for price
inflation in 2003, at least fifty-two other state and local Medicaid agencies have filed suit
against the many drug manufacturers for similar schemes. The State is aware of over
sixty instances where various Defendants have been named in those actions.16
Judge Patti Saris of the multi-district litigation in the District of Massachusetts has
overseen much of this litigation and had opportunity to review Defendants' conduct in
great detail. It is therefore telling that in February of 2010, Judge Saris entered summary
judgment against a group of thirteen defendants - including three defendants in this case:
Boehringer Ingelheim, Schering-Plough, and Wyeth - for issuing inflated price reports to
induce higher payments from government programs, including various Medicaid
agencies.

In re Pharmaceutical Industry Average Wholesale Price Litigation, 685

F.Supp.2d 186 (D.Mass., 2010).
The specific case at issue in that decision arose out of New York State. New
York's false claims act is somewhat more exacting than Utah's, as it requires an attempt
to obtain payment from public funds - a requirement that is not present in the Utah False
Claims Act. See. Even with that heightened standard, Judge Saris granted summary
judgment to New York. "Under [the New York false claims act], Plaintiffs must show
that Defendants knowingly made false statements or representations on behalf of
themselves or others to attempt to obtain payment from public funds. Even viewing the
See Addendum C, attached, listing all other Medicaid programs and agencies of which
the State is aware that have filed suit against Defendants.
9

facts in the light most favorable to the Defendants, and drawing all reasonable inferences
in their favor, the Plaintiffs have proved that Defendants, by submitting false AWPs and
WACs that were used by CMS in setting FULs, have done just that."

In re

Pharmaceutical Industry, 685 F.Supp.2d at 207.
The State understands that being named in multiple lawsuits does not prove
Defendants' liability, nor does the State presume that the MDL order on summary
judgment is controlling. However, the State refers to these other cases and Judge Saris'
opinion to demonstrate that, at the very least, Defendants are well-aware of this type of
litigation. Their arguments to the contrary ring hollow.
II.

The State's Claims Satisfy Rule 9(b).17
The District Court ruled, and Defendants argue, that the State failed to satisfy the

requirements of Rule 9(b). In so doing, the lower court and Defendants ignore the central
purpose and requirement of the Rule, which is to give sufficient notice of the claims at
hand. Instead, they argue that the State must specify the "who, what, when, where, and
how" of each inflated price report with particularity, ignoring the practical impossibility
of such a pleading. The State does not have access to these details, nor could such details

The State maintains its position, explained in its opening brief, that Rule 9(b) does not
apply to the Utah False Claims Act. Defendants' are unable to cite any controlling
opinion to the contrary, and rely exclusively upon foreign decisions that have nothing to
do with the Utah False Claims Act. See Karvelas v. Melrose Wakefield Hosp., 360 F.3d
220, 228 (1 st Cir. 2004) (a qui tarn action under the federal false claims act);
Nevertheless, should this Court find that Rule 9(b) does apply to the False Claims Act,
the State continues to argue that its Second Amended Complaint satisfied the Rule, as set
forth herein.
10

of perhaps a million or more misrepresentations be pled with the shortness or plainness
required by Rule 8(a).
The District Court's ruling that this failure is fatal to the State's claims invites
unchecked exploitation of state programs and funds. Under the opinion of the lower
court, abusers of the Medicaid program can hide behind Rule 9(b), so long as they
conceal the fine details of their actions to prevent the State from ever being able to plead
them.

Defendants scoff at the State's claim that such use of Rule 9(b) is a legal

technicality; however, use of a legal rule to avoid responsibility for such clear abuse is
the very definition of the term. It is not the purpose of Rule 9(b) to act as a shield for
Defendants' behavior when there is ample evidence of their wrongdoing, nor was it the
intent of the legislature to have the False Claims Act rendered impotent by the very acts
of deception it proscribes.
The State's Second Amended Complaint satisfies Rule 9(b)'s purpose of providing
adequate notice to the Defendants of the nature and basis for the claims against them and
the type of litigation involved. See Hill v. Alfred, 2001 UT 16, If 14; 28 P.3d 1271 (Utah
2001). As such, the District Court's decision should be overturned.
A. Defendants' Cited Cases Are Not Applicable To The State's Claims.
The District Court and Defendants rely upon case law that does not consider how
the exacting details they demand could be pled by a plaintiff that does not have them,
especially in a case involving an enormous number of misrepresentations over more than
a dozen years. Defendants cite cases that involve only one or a few incidents of

11

fraudulent conduct,

instead of the broad schemes at issue in this case. As a practical

matter, pleading only a few incidents with particular detail is one thing; pleading
hundreds of thousands - perhaps even millions - of misrepresentations to a third party is
another, and merits different treatment under Rule 9(b). See General Ace. Ins. Co. of
America v. Fidelity and Deposit Co. of Maryland, 598 F.Supp. 1223 (D.C.Pa, 1984)
(Holding that in cases of fraud over an extended period of time or a series of transactions,
it is not necessary to recite, in detail, the facts of each transaction of the fraudulent
scheme.); FSLIC v. Shearson-American Exp.y Inc., 658 F.Supp. 1331, 1337 (D. Puerto
Rico, 1987) (Holding that pleading specific facts of individual transactions in a broad,
fraudulent scheme is not required and may in fact be impossible.).
Similarly, the cases employed by Defendants to argue that the Utah False Claims
Act is subject to the strictest reading of Rule 9(b) are significantly distinct from this case
in both type and factual background.19 All such cases involved qui tarn actions brought
by "whistle blower" relators who had worked inside those defendants' operations. This

Armed Forces Ins. Exchange v. Harrison, 70 P.3d 35 (Utah 2003); Cook v. Zions First
Nat. Bank, 645 F.Supp. 423 (D.Utah 1986); Coroles v. Sabey
19
Sikkenga v. Regence BCBS of Utah, All F.3d 702 (10th Cir. 2006); U.S. ex rel. Lacy v,
New Horizons, Inc., 348 Fed.Appx. 421 (10th Cir. 2009); U.S. ex rel. Karvelas v.
Melrose-Wakefield Hosp., 360 F.2d 220 (1st Cir. 2004); Mitchell v. Beverly Enterprises,
Inc., 248 Fed. Appx 73 (11th Cir. 2007); U.S. ex rel Hebert v. Dizney, 295 Fed.Appx.
717 (5th Cir. 2008); Ebeidex rel. U.S. v. Lungwitz, 616 F.3d 992 (9th Cir. 2010); City of
Cudahy ex rel Monforton v. Sheppard, 2009 WL 323761 (Cal.App. 2 Dist. 2009);
Yuhasz v. Brush Wellman, Inc., 341 F.3d 559 (6th Cir. 2003); U.S. ex rel. Totten v.
Bombardier Corp., 286 F.3d 542 (C.A.D.C, 2002); Bly-Magee v. California, 236 F.3d
1014 (9th Cir. 2001); Harrison v. Westinghouse Savannah River Co., 176 F.3d 776 (4th
Cir., 1999); U.S. ex rel LaCorte v. SmithKline Beecham, 149 F.3d 227 (3rd Cir. 1998);
U.S. ex rel. Thompson v. Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp., 125 F.3d 899 (5th Cir. 1997);
Gold v. Morrison-Knudsen Co., 68 F.3d 1475 (2nd Cir., 1995).
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gave those insider plaintiffs first-hand knowledge of the wrongs committed, which made
the pleading of details a realistic requirement.
The position and knowledge of the State in this action stands in stark contrast to
that of the relator plaintiffs in those cases. This is not a qui tarn action, but rather an
attorney general enforcement action, where the State does not have the insider, first-hand
knowledge of a relator. The State was not a party to the reports but only received
compiled prices through First DataBank.

Moreover, if the standard set forth in

Defendants' cited cases did apply to the State's claims, then other courts would have
specifically applied it in the myriad other AWP cases that have been filed around the
country. Defendants' failure to cite any authority to that effect is a glaring hole in their
argument.
Defendants do cite an opinion by Judge Saris in the AWP MDL given on a motion
to dismiss, which requires "(1) the specific drug or drugs that were purchased from
defendant, [and] (2) the allegedly fraudulent AWP for each drug..." In re Pharm. Indus.
Average Wholesale Price Litig, 263 F.Supp.2d 172, 194 (D. Mass. 2003). The State
agrees that this case is more analogous to its claims than the other cases cited by
Defendants. However, noticeably absent is the requirement that an AWP plaintiff must
plead the "who, what, when, where, and how" of each specific price report. Instead,
Defendants focus on Judge Saris' requirement that the "allegedly fraudulent AWP for
each drug" be pled.
However, Judge Saris' request for an allegedly fraudulent AWP is inapplicable to
the facts of the present case, and in any event does nothing to further the requirements of
13

Rule 9(b) under Utah law. As outlined above, the State does not have access to the
reported prices or what the actual prices should have been. However, the adequacy of the
State's complaint should not turn on its ability to plead information that Defendants have
labored to conceal, especially in light of the ample evidence of Defendants' abuses. Even
if the State were to plead a "snapshot" of prices at a single given time by providing a
single AWP for each drug, it would not cover the enormous number of reports that were
actually made during the 15-year period. Because of this, any such pleading would not
be reliably accurate to cover the entirety of the State's claims.
Moreover, other states have filed similar claims without pleading the allegedly
fraudulent AWPs of the drugs at issue.

The State is not aware that any of those cases

were dismissed for failing to do so. Many of these complaints are notably similar to
Utah's. As such, the requirement that the allegedly fraudulent AWPs be pled is not
universal, and should not be applied here and reward Defendants for their efforts to
obscure that information.
B. Rule 9(b)'s Purpose and Satisfaction in This Case.
The State therefore asks this Court to consider the substance of its claims, rather
than the impossible form focused on by the District Court. As explained by the State in
its opening brief, Rule 9(b)'s purpose is to give defendants "fair notice of the nature of
and basis or grounds for the claim and general indication of the type of litigation
See Addendums D through J, which include the AWP complaints of the states of
Alabama, Alaska, Idaho, Kansas, Kentucky, Mississippi, and Texas - none of which
contain the allegedly fraudulent AWP for each drug at issue in those cases. At least one
of the Defendants in this case was named in the complaints of Alabama, Alaska,
Mississippi, and Texas.
14

involved. " Hill v. Allred, 2001 UT 16, H 14; 28 P.3d 1271 (Utah 2001). Under Utah law,
a Rule 9(b) complaint must give "notice of the issues raised and an opportunity to meet
them." Williams v. State Farm Ins. Co., 656 P.2d 966, 970 (Utah 1982). "When this is
accomplished, that is all that is required." Cheney v. Rucker, 381 P.2d 86, 91 (Utah,
1963).21
Providing notice in a case such as this can be done broadly. In cases involving
numerous misrepresentations over an extended period of time, "it is not necessary to
recite, in detail, the facts of each transaction of the fraudulent scheme." General Ace. Ins.
Co. of America v. Fidelity and Deposit Co. of Maryland, 598 F.Supp. 1223 (D.C.Pa,
1984). The reasoning employed in the case of Federal Savings and Loan Insurance
Corp. v. Shearson-American Exp., Inc. is instructive:
All that is required to fulfill the particularity requirement of Rule
9(b) is that a complaint set forth the substance of plaintiffs claim with
sufficient detail to evoke the defendant's answer, since Rule 9 is not to be
applied with draconian strictness. The purpose of Rule 9(b) is to protect
defendants from unfair surprise and to give a defendant notice of the nature
of the claims against it.

In their brief, Defendants attempt to claim a broader purpose for Rule 9(b) - to protect
their reputation from "spurious charges" and avoid "fishing expeditions" by plaintiffs.
Brief of Appellees, p. 10. However, Defendants provide no controlling Utah authority to
support such expansion of the Rule's intent. Moreover, these other purposes have no
bearing on this case, as the State is not in the habit of legal "fishing expeditions," and
Defendants' reputations will not be harmed by Utah joining the dozens of other states
making claims against them - claims which are clearly not "spurious."
15

FSLIC v. Shearson-American Exp., Inc., 658 F.Supp. 1331, 1337 (D. Puerto Rico, 1987)
(internal citations omitted). Thus, Rule 9(b) is to be applied for the purpose of providing
sufficient notice and nothing more; it does not require particularity merely for its own
sake. The court then went on:
Even though in some situations the identification of the time, place
and content of an alleged fraudulent representation may be required to
fulfill the rule's purpose to give notice of the conduct charged and to
protect a defendant from spurious charges, nothing in the rules requires it.

Also, less particularity is required where the plaintiff is not asserting that
the fraud was committed against it but against a third party. Indeed, in
some situations specificity may never even be possible, as when fraudulent
representations may have been made over a long period of time. If the
fraud involved either a course of conduct occurring over an extended
period of time or a series of transactions, it is not necessary to recite in
detail the facts of each transaction of the fraudulent scheme.
Id., (emphasis added; internal citations omitted).
In another analogous case involving government claims against drug companies
for fraud, a Montana court found that broadly pleading a scheme of fraud was sufficient
to satisfy Rule 9(b). There, the State of Montana was suing the manufacturers of the
drugs Risperdal and Seroquel for fraudulent claims made in the marketing of those drugs.
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The defendant drug manufacturers insisted that Montana must plead the specific details
of every fraudulent misrepresentation.
Citing the Montana Supreme Court, the court reasoned that "[t]he sufficiency of a
particular pleading under Rule 9(b) depends upon a number of variables... Perhaps the
most basic consideration in making a judgment as to the sufficiency of a pleading is the
determination of how much detail is necessary to give adequate notice to an adverse
party and enable him to prepare a responsive pleading'" Memorandum and Order on
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss and Parties Agreement to Sever, Montana v. Janssen, et
aL, No. CDV-2008-164, p. 7 (Mont. 1st Dist. Ct, Nov. 3, 2010) (emphasis added).22
Employing this reasoning, the court concluded "that the degree of specificity
contemplated by most decisions involving fraud allegations is lacking here. Nonetheless,
Plaintiff has given Defendants notice of the specific types of wrongful conduct being
alleged... If the Court accepts Defendants' contentions that the requirements of Rule
9(b) are not met by Plaintiffs complaint, such finding would necessarily assume that
Defendants have not been provided adequate notice of the allegations against them to
formulate a proper responsive pleading. Given the arguments advanced by Defendants in
their motion to dismiss, such does not appear to be the case." Id.
These cases demonstrate that Rule 9(b) does not require the pleading of all fine
details of every misrepresentation when a broader, long-running scheme is the subject of

Attached hereto as Addendum K.
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the case, or when the misrepresentations were made to a third party.

The key

consideration is whether the allegations have been pled with enough particularity to give
a defendant notice of the type of claims involved. Such is the case here.
C. The State's Second Amended Complaint Satisfied Rule 9(b) Under This
Standard,
The question then under this Court's previous decisions in Hill, Williams, and
Cheney is whether defendants a) have fair notice of the nature of and basis for the claims
against them, and b) understand the type of litigation involved. See Hill, supra. If the
answer to these questions is "yes," then Rule 9(b) has been satisfied.
i. Defendants have fair notice of the nature of and basis for the claims
against them.
As explained above, Defendants are familiar with the State's Medicaid drug
reimbursement program. Each defendant participates in price reporting and is well-aware
of the State's reliance on its reporting of accurate "average wholesale prices" for their
drugs. The State claims that Defendants have instead been reporting inflated prices over
a fifteen-year period, and that all of Defendants' pricing reports were inflated during that
time. See Second Amended Complaint, ffi[ 9-103 (R.l 120-1134). Despite defendants'
protestations, this makes for a profoundly simple case: either Defendants gave honest and
accurate reports or they did not. Each defendant may wish to qualify its actions with
details of certain reports, but there is no mistaking the State's allegation under the False
23

See also Gonzales v. Lloyds TSB Bank, PLC, 532 F. Supp.2d 1200 (CD. Cal., 2006);
Neilson v. Union Bank of Calfornia, N.A., 290 F.Supp.2d 1101 (CD. Cal., 2003); U.S. v.
CAP Quality Care, Inc., 2006 WL 1030101 (D.Me. 2006); Norton Steel Co., Ltd. V.
Melsonlnc., 1995 WL 363715 (N.D.N.Y., 1995); Elgin Sweeper Co. v. Melsonlnc., 884
F.Supp. 641 (N.D.N.Y., 1995).
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Claims Act. Defendants therefore clearly have notice of the nature of and basis for the
claims against them.
ii. Defendants have fair notice of the type of litigation involved.
Again, as already explained, at least fifty-two other similar lawsuits have been
filed by state and local Medicaid agencies around the country, including those
consolidated in the multi-district litigation in the District of Massachusetts. The majority
of Defendants have been named in those suits. Indeed, Defendants point out that only
two of their number - Morton Grove and Qualitest Pharmaceuticals - have not been
named in a similar litigation. As noted above, the evidence of widespread price inflation
is so damning that the MDL court granted summary judgment on the issue.
Defendants argue that they cannot be charged with their own knowledge of those
cases when considering the sufficiency of the State's pleadings. However, they fail to
explain why. Defendants have not provided any authority stating that each and every
case is pled in a vacuum. Indeed, the very nature of notice pleadings depends in large
part upon the putative defendant's own knowledge.
Here, however, we need not rely upon Defendants' knowledge alone; the public
record is replete with myriad examples of the Defendants already embroiled in the type of
litigation at issue. As two of the few drug companies around the country who have
escaped litigation for their actions until now, Morton Grove and Qualitest
Pharmaceuticals can hardly plead ignorance of these cases when the majority of their
industry is involved. Therefore, an argument that any Defendant does not have notice of
the type of litigation involved is beyond belief. Moreover, in their briefs, Defendants are
19

not willing to certify under Rule 11 that they have no knowledge or notice of the State's
allegations. They are well-aware of the type of litigation involved in this action.
The State's allegations are clear.

Either Defendants are guilty of providing

inflated price reports over the given fifteen-year period, or they are not. They cannot
reasonably or believably argue that they do not understand such claims and have not
received fair notice of them. As such, Rule 9(b) has been satisfied, and no more is
required under this Court's previous rulings. The State therefore respectfully asks that
the Court overturn the District Court's order, and reinstate this action.
III.

The District Court's Ruling Under Rule 12(b)(6) Was Improper And Should
Be Overturned.
Defendants argue that dismissal of the State's claims was proper under Rule

12(b)(6). Defendants' arguments, as well as the ruling of the District Court, misapply
Rule 12(b)(6) as having a higher standard than it actually does.

Defendants claim that

the State did not adequately plead the elements of those claims. However, as explained
in the State's opening brief, the State did plead the elements of its claims to a level that, if
true, would entitle it to relief. This is the standard of Rule 12(b)(6).
A. Rule 12(b)(6) permits dismissal only when a plaintiff is not entitled to
relief under any state of facts which could be proved in support of its
claims.
Dismissal under rule 12(b)(6) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure is warranted
"only in cases in which, even if the factual assertions in the complaint were correct, they
provide no legal basis for recovery." Mackey v. Cannon, 2000 UT App 36, \ 13, 996
P.2d 1081. "A dismissal is a severe measure and should be granted by the trial court only
20

if it is clear that a party is not entitled to relief under any state of facts which could be
proved in support of its claim." Id. at *f 9 (citing Colman v. Utah State LandBd., 795 P.2d
622, 624 (Utah 1990)). "The courts are a forum for settling controversies, and if there is
any doubt about whether a claim should be dismissed for the lack of a factual basis, the
issue should be resolved in favor of giving the party an opportunity to present its proof."
Id. at \ 12 (citing Colman, 795 P.2d at 624). Rule 12(b)(6), therefore, is not a basis for
dismissal if there is any way that a plaintiff can make a case under the allegations pled in
its complaint.
B. Relief can be granted under the State's alleged claims as pled in the
Second Amended Complaint
Defendants argue that the State did not properly plead facts to support the
elements of its claims.

Specifically, Defendants argue that under fraudulent

misrepresentation, the State failed to plead reasonable reliance and inducement to act.
Under the False Claims Act, Defendants argue that the State failed to plead the causation
of false claims, the receipt of any benefit by Defendants, or that Defendants' price reports
affected the State's payments. All of this is inaccurate; the State pled facts sufficient to
set forth the elements of its claims. Moreover, the receipt of a benefit is not an element
of the False Claims Act. As such, dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) was improper and
should be overturned
i. The Second Amended Complaint adequately pled the elements of the
State's claims.
The State's Second Amended Complaint, attached as Addendum G to the State's
opening brief, set forth the following allegations:
21

•

"Utah Medicaid reimburses medical providers, including physicians and
pharmacists, for drugs prescribed for, and dispensed to, Utah Medicaid recipients
pursuant to statutory and administrative formulas. Second Amended Complaint, ^f
106 (R. at 1135).

•

"Reimbursement for pharmacy-dispensed prescription drugs under the Utah
Medicaid program is based on information supplied by Defendants to industry
reporting services." Second Amended Complaint, ^f 107 (R. at 1135).

•

"At all relevant times to this action, Utah Medicaid relied upon [the price reports]
provided by Defendants to the industry reporting services in determining the
amount Utah Medicaid reimburses providers." Id., ^[ 119 (R. at 1139).

•

The State reasonably relied upon that information under federal guidelines. See
Id., ffll 109 and 111 (R. at 1136 and 1137); 47 CFR § 447.331-332.

•

"The Defendants' inflated AWPs were the only variable in the formulas used by
the State to reimburse brand name drugs. Thus, had the Defendants' AWPs been
lower, the amounts the State would have pad for brand name drugs would have
been correspondingly lower." Second Amended Complaint, f 115 (R. at 1138).

•

"Defendants' AWPs were [also] an essential variable in deciding what the lowest
price was in the formula for reimbursing generic drugs..." Id., ^f 116 (R. at 1138).

•

"The State would have reimbursed [for generic drugs] on the basis of 'estimated
acquisition cost' if that cost had been the lowest of these three measures. But
because the estimated acquisition cost was inflated by Defendants' AWPs, the
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State lost the chance to make that comparison and save itself money." Id., f 117
(R. at 1139).
•

"Furthermore, the Defendants concealed the true prices knowing that Utah
Medicaid relied upon the false reported prices." Id., If 121 (R. at 1140).

•

"The claims at issue were made for the medical benefit of Utah Medicaid
recipients. By injecting false prices into Utah's reimbursement process, the
Defendants directed others to submit claims which led to

false

reimbursements..." f 128 (R. at 1142).
•

"The false prices reported by Defendants caused to be made or presented to
an employee or officer of the State a claim for a medical benefit in violation
of U.C.A. § 26-20-7(1). Specifically, the Defendants knew their false
prices would result in the presentation of claims that are wholly or partially
false, fictitious, or fraudulent, in violation of U.C.A. § 26-20-7(a)(l)." Id.,
1129 (R. at 1142).

•

"Each and every Defendant derived benefits directly from the State, in that
the State's Medicaid expenditures ultimately ended up in the pockets of the
Defendants." Id., ^ 128 (R. at 1142).
In these allegations, the State has clearly pled facts to support claims that the State

reasonably relied upon Defendants price reports, and had to do so under federal
regulation.24

See 47 CFR § 447.331-332. Similarly, these allegations set forth that

24

In considering the question of reasonable reliance in the case of Massachusetts v. Mylan
Laboratories, another AWP case administered by Judge Saris, the court ruled that the
23

Defendants reports induced the State to pay prices based upon those reports, as they were
the "only variable" in the price of brand name drugs, and an "essential variable" in the
price or generic drugs.

Thus, these elements of the State's claim for fraudulent

misrepresentation were properly pled.
Moreover, the State clearly alleged that Defendants' false pricing reports caused
medical providers and pharmacies to make claims for drug benefits at false price levels.
Additionally, the State alleged throughout these statements that Defendants' price reports
directly affected the State's price levels. Thus, these elements of the False Claims Act
were plainly pled.
With respect to Defendants' receipt of a benefit from the State, the Second
Amended Complaint clearly alleges that such a benefit was received because the money
used by the State to pay for the drugs ultimately ended up in the hands of Defendants.
However, this is immaterial, as the receipt of a direct benefit from the State is not an
element of the False Claims Act. It is not necessary to receive a benefit from the State to
violate the Act; only the making or causation of the false claim alone is required. See
mere fact that a state "expended untold millions paying for the drugs at issue" was ample
evidence of reliance upon the pricing reports, and that "reasonableness" was a question
for a factfinder to decide. Massachusetts v. Mylan Labs, 608 F.Supp.2d 127, 157
(D.Mass., 2008).
25
The federal court in Massachusetts v. Mylan Labs also found that "the defendants
reported false prices to MassHealth [Massachusetts' Medicaid program] via the
publishing compendium knowing that pharmacies would present claims to MassHealth
which will be reimbursed based on a formula that utilizes the inflated price to determine
the appropriate reimbursement amount. Thus, although the manufacturers do not
themselves submit claims to the Commonwealth...th claims here were predicated on an
underlying fraudulent pricing scheme. The defendants are thus chargeable with causing
false claims to be presented to the Commonwealth. Massachusetts v. Mylan Labs, 608
F.Supp.2d 127, 145 (D.Mass., 2008).
24

U.C.A. 26-20-7(1).
The State therefore properly pled the elements of its claims. Dismissal under Rule
12(b)(6) is therefore improper and should be overturned.
IV.

The Applicable Statute Of Limitations
The Court must determine the applicable statute of limitation to the State's claims.

Defendants argue that the applicable statute of limitations is one year, per Utah Code §
78B-2-302, and that said statute has expired on all claims regarding conduct prior to
April 30, 2006. Defendants dismiss the State's arguments concerning the application of
the catch-all statute found in § 78B-2-307(3), and the six-year statute for writings under §
78B-2-309(2). Defendants also claim that there is no authority to support the State's
argument that every new false claim restarts the limitations period.

However,

Defendants' position is based upon erroneous or incomplete reading of the applicable
statutes and case law.
A. The One-Year Statute Of Limitations For Civil Penalties To The State
Does Not Include Claims For Restitution.
Defendants over-read the limitations period found in Utah Code § 78B-2-302(3),
which places a limit of one year "upon a statute... for a forfeiture or penalty to the state."
The State does not dispute that this applies to the specific "civil penalty" under the Act.
Defendants neglect to consider, however, that the False Claims Act provides not only for
a civil penalty of treble damages, but also for "full and complete restitution to the state"
and the "costs of enforcement of this chapter." Utah Code § 26-20-9.5(2). As the
wording of § 78B-2-302(2) is limited to "forfeiture or penalty," that limitation does not
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cover the State's other claims under the False Claims Act, nor under its claims for
fraudulent misrepresentation.
B, A Four- or Six-Year Statute Of Limitations Should Be Applied To the
State's Claims For Restitution And Costs.
The four- or six-year statutes of limitation should be applied to the State's claims
for restitution and costs of enforcement under Utah Code § 78B-2-307 and 309(2),
respectively. Defendants argue that the four-year catch-all statutory period should not
apply because, per their previous argument, a one-year statute applies under § 78B-2302(3). However, as just pointed out, that statute is limited to penalties to the State, not
restitution or costs. As such, the four-year statute would be applicable.
The State suggested a different applicable statutory period under § 78B-2-309(2)
for "any contract, obligation, liability founded upon an instrument in writing."
Defendants scoff at the State's position as "facially ridiculous," since the State did not
technically file a breach of contract claim. However, Defendants are once again guilty of
misreading the quoted statute. The statute does not limit its application to "breach of
contract" claims; rather, it states quite clearly that it applies to "any...liability founded
upon an instrument in writing."
Defendants' liabilities are founded upon the instrument in writing that is the Utah
Medicaid Plan. Defendants agreed to abide by that plan when they became Medicaid
providers. The plan required Defendants to provide accurate pricing information. See
Addendum F to the State's opening brief, Utah state Medicaid Plan, attachment 4.19-B,
section S: Prescribed Drugs, 19-19b. Defendants' failure to do so therefore violated the

26

agreement embedded in this writing. As such, by its own plain language, § 78B-2-309(2)
applies to this action.
C. This Court has already created recent authority supporting the State's
proposition that the applicable statute of limitations begins to run anew
every time a violation occurs.
In its opening brief, the State noted that a cause of action does not accrue until the
final element of the cause of action has been committed. As such, a violation of the False
Claims Act has not been committed until a false claim is made or caused. Ignoring the
State's citation to Johnson v. State, 945 P.2d 673, Defendants claim that the State
provided no authority for this position. Then, ignoring the basic legal principle that all
elements of a claim must be present before an action can be brought, Defendants argue
that the State's "reasoning is illogical."
It is a foundational tenet of the legal system that a valid claim must have all
elements present before it is actionable. The limitations period begins when such a claim
becomes actionable, and not before.

As such, the State's claims for fraudulent

misrepresentation begin to run not when Defendant's made their false price reports, but
when the State was damaged by them by paying falsely inflated prices. Whenever a new
such payment was made under the prices established with Defendants' inflated reports, a
new cause of action accrued. Similarly, under the False Claims Act, the statutory period
did not begin with Defendants' false price reports, but when a claim for payment by a
pharmacist was made or caused to be made, as proscribed by that Act. Therefore, every
time such a claim was made or caused, a new cause of action accrued under that Act.
Defendants ask for authority to support such a basic principle, and this Court has already
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obliged. "Under Utah law, the statute of limitations begins to run when the cause of
action accrues." Retherfordv. AT&T Communications, 844 P.2d 949, 975 (Utah, 1992).
The State's position is not unlike the "continuing tort doctrine," which this Court
has recently had opportunity to review in two cases of ongoing tortious conduct.
Cabaness v. Thomas, 232 P.3d 486 (Utah, 2010) (applying the doctrine to claims of
intentional infliction of emotional distress); Bingham v. Roosevelt City Corp,, 235 P.3d
730 (Utah, 2010) (applying the doctrine in a case of ongoing negligence). That rule
provides for "tolling the statute of limitations while the tortious conduct continues
unabated" {Bingham, 235 P.3d at 745), and "involves viewing the defendant's conduct as
a continuous whole..." {Feltmeier v. Feltmeier, 798 N.E.2d 75 [111., 2003]). In Bingham,
this Court stated that it had "recognized the continuing tort rule in a variety of situations,
including nuisance, trespass, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and continuous
medical treatment." Id.

The Court then went on to apply the rule to instances of

negligence as well.
This case is not dissimilar from these holdings, in that a cause of action accrues
only when all elements have been fulfilled, and for the last time. Defendants' conduct
constitutes such a pattern of abuse against the State and its Medicaid program. As such, a
similar ruling from the Court would be proper in this case.
CONCLUSION
Defendants' abused the State's Medicaid program for fifteen years by reporting
inflated drug prices, thereby causing the State to overpay for those drugs. The State now
seeks to recover those overpayments as provided and required by Utah law. The State's
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Second Amended Complaint adequately set forth the State's claims with sufficient
particularity to give the Defendants notice of the basis and grounds for the claims against
them and the type of litigation involved.

The Second Amended Complaint also

adequately pled the State's claims, including facts showing each necessary element. The
State therefore respectfully asks the Court to overturn the District Court's decision and
reinstate this case with the appropriate statutory limitation period.
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